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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision o f the Academic 
Council o f the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim o f this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, o f European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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The Paper is drawn from a series of three lectures given by Professor 
GlULIANO AMATO in October 1993, under the auspices of the Jean Monnet 
Chair Lecture Series of the Robert Schuman Centre, European University 
Institute. In his first lecture, GlULIANO AMATO gives an incisive account into 
his role in the process of institutional change that had befallen the Italian polit­
ical system during his experience as Prime Minister. In his second and third 
lectures, the author turns his attention to the problems of constructing Europe. 
In addressing "the present problems of Europe", Professor AMATO makes a 
strong, yet constructive criticism of the problems inherent in the process of 
European integration. The third lecture, as its title suggests, consolidates the 
positive criticism from the previous lecture, and examines "the prospects for 
the construction of an European Union".
The author wishes to acknowledge the kind invitation by Professor YVES 
MÉNY, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre, to hold the Jean Monnet 
Chair, the assistance of the members of the Robert Schuman Centre in the 
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My experience as Prime Minister
Speaking of my experience as Prime Minister is not as easy as it might seem. 
Even though I was in office for a relatively short period (by international stan­
dards at least -  in Italian terms, it was actually an average period, which is part 
of the problem), a lot of things happened during this experience which provide 
many interesting topics for discussion.
One such area of interest was international relations at that particular mo­
ment; economic and financial reforms were also intense in those few months: 
when Franco Modigliani invited Italians to re-enter into human race, I felt that 
his words reflected exactly what I was trying to do. And in this respect, there 
was actually a major difficulty in convincing people that there was a difference 
between what they were doing and what they could actually allow themselves 
to do. However, as a professor of constitutional law, today I am particularly 
tempted to limit my discourse to considering the aspects of that experience 
which are more relevant to my profession. And it is also easier in some ways, 
because, as a professor of constitutional law, I can say in retrospect, that I was 
lucky to be Prime Minister at the beginning of this legislature. Perhaps, I was 
less fortunate however, as a politician, but allow me enjoy at least the fact that, 
after all, I am still, as always, a professor.
On the whole, I was lucky for one particular reason: when I became Prime 
Minister, the Italian system of government was based upon interrelationship be­
tween long-standing customs and rules, which were rather inflexible, and pre­
conceived ideas of the roles of its single actors; namely, of the members of 
Parliament, the Executive, the Prime Minister, and Ministers. By the time I left 
office, however, and this was only ten months later, this system had been com­
pletely turned upside down. The rules were not the same any more. During this 
short period of time, what we as Italians call the material constitution (which is 
an adaptation of Karl Schmidt's concept -  an Italian adaptation, thanks to 
Costantino Mortati, that refers to the substantive rules of the political system 
and of the system of government) underwent a profound change. We had a 
material constitution at the beginning of the legislature. We had a very different 
one after the ten months of my cabinet.
Just to clarify this point, I draw your attention to the peculiar features of the 
Italian system of government as it grew up after World War Two, which I'm 
sure you're already familiar with, and the fact that the Italian Republic was 




























































































democracy. Political parties were, and perhaps still are, very important in any 
Western democracy, but their role in Italy is really not comparable with the role 
political parties play in other democracies. In Italy, they were more important, 
much more important.
I remember a lecture I gave a few years ago, it was actually three years ago. 
Most of us were already aware of the fact that political parties had perhaps out­
grown their intended purpose and had become too influential. In that lecture, I 
played a sort of practical joke on my audience, by citing an article of a foreign 
constitution, which defined the role of the single party within that constitution.
I read this Article, substituting "party" with "parties". Hence, the "parties" 
will determine the policies, to be followed by the government and the congress, 
and the "parties" are responsible for the basic values, and so on and so forth. 
Without explaining precisely what I was reading, I asked my audience whether 
this applied in the Italian case. After a moment’s hesitation, there was the over­
whelming response: "Well, yes, of course it does". In fact, the provision I had 
mis-quoted was Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution. Even though in our case, I 
referred to "party" in the plural, it is important to realize that this was the kind 
of role that our parties had in this system.
There is a very straight-forward reason for this, but unless you are familiar 
with Italy, you are probably not aware of it. It is a very substantial reason that 
has to do with the origins of this Republic, with the years immediately preced­
ing the birth of the Republic.
After September 8th 1943, what Italians had until then considered to be their 
State disappeared all of a sudden. The king, who was supposed to represent the 
State, slipped away from Rome by car during the night, escaping to Southern 
Italy, and left Italians under the impression that the State was no longer there to 
perform its tasks. If you have seen the wonderful movie starring Alberto Sordi, 
"Tutti a casa", you'll understand exactly how the Italians felt at that time. 
Italians were left on their own to face their problems, either as heroes or cow­
ards. The important thing to understand here, is that nobody was there to tell 
them what they were supposed to do; no-one to instruct Italian soldiers, the 
army. At that point, a new authority entered into the political arena, that was of 
course, the authority of the political parties, whose members served on the lib­
eration committee, "Comitato di liberazione nazionale". They filled the vac­
uum, and effectively became the voice of the State, because they became the 
only recognized and visible authority that took on the task of getting Italy back 
on its feet, dealing with the immense problems relating to the Italian identity 
(who are we? who are our allies, our enemies?), to the small problems (how do 
we get milk on a day-to-day basis? how do we get the power we need to tight 
our lamps?).
The parties appointed ministers and as well people to run the municipal com­




























































































Italy, whether large or small. The "lottizzazione" began at that time -  and the 
parties got used to sending their men as appointees on the public services 
boards at that time, when nobody else was prepared to do this job.
Initially, our parties had a strong legitimacy in doing what, fifty years later, 
had become their unacceptable invasion of the public system. However, to un­
derstand how it grew up, you have to be aware its beginnings.
These beginnings are important for another reason: when our constitution 
was written, its protagonists were the parties. They were our founding fathers 
so to speak. Let us compare the Italian Constitution with the German Grund- 
gesetz. Here there were two constitutions drafted contemporaneously, both bom 
out of very similar past experiences, and both seeking to resolve the same kind 
of problems. In both Italy and Germany, the founding fathers were aware that 
they needed a system which would avoid making the same mistakes as before: 
thus, they needed to develop a more stabilized cabinet, a stronger executive, a 
more diluted role of the President of the Republic. Both discussed the same 
kind of constitutional devices, needed to stabilize the cabinet, to reduce frag­
mentation, and to have more homogeneous majorities in parliament. You find 
the same discussions in the two countries, and the same kind of constitutional 
devices were conceived to resolve those problems. They were adopted in 
Germany, but not in Italy. Why not in the case of Italy?
For a very simple and evident reason, as was openly stated by Giorgio 
Amendola in our Constitutional Assembly: we don't need these kinds of things 
in Italy, because we, the parties, are the guarantors of everything. If there is, 
and this is a very peculiar Italian expression, the necessary political will (in 
Italian, "la volontà politica" -  that magical component capable of making any­
thing happen) the majority is strong; without the necessary political will, the 
majority is inevitably weak. We will guarantee that the necessary political will 
exists; we, the parties, and if we cannot, then nobody else can do it, no other 
constitutional device can substitute our essential role. Thus, there could be no 
stabilization of the executive, no constructive vote of confidence, none of these 
things, because the institutions were guaranteed by the political parties. From 
the beginning then, you have this "original sin", even if originally considered a 
blessing: weak institutions and strong political parties, and the belief that the 
system would work because of the strength and the authority injected by those 
decision-makers from outside.
This is the background to the system that grew up in the post-war years, with 
an ever-increasing role played by the parties, which was seen in every aspect of 
public life. Policies were determined and implemented even in their smallest 
detail in a direct way by the parties or party officials. The activities of the party 
experts were not limited simply to reviewing the programmes of the majority 
party in Parliament or those of the coalition parties, but covered equally those 




























































































jor bill of the cabinet was subject to prior discussion with the experts of the 
parties. Here, I have particularly in my mind, the long meetings in the eighties, 
with the party representative, before a bill could finally be submitted to the 
Council of Ministers, with the experts of the parties invited in Palazzo Chigi. It 
was the experts who had become the protagonists, and only after their approval 
of each and every one of the bills could they be submitted for adoption by the 
Council of the Ministers.
Neither was party involvement limited solely to policy-making; it extended 
also to appointments. One might reasonably foresee that this could cover the 
appointment of ministers, but it didn't stop there. The parties also decided upon 
the under-secretaries, which might seem less reasonable, and chairmen and 
members of the boards of any public company or highly important public body 
or even if of small importance, including the appointment of top executives of 
public departments. It is beyond any doubt that this was not patronage, but 
something quite different. Patronage could conceivably be taken to mean that 
some low-ranking civil-servants might get appointed in order to meet my elec­
toral needs. What we are talking about here is a multiple, pervasive and unlim­
ited spoilt system, because a coalition government multiplies the numbers of 
spoilt positions -  because those are the needs of not only my party, but also 
your party, his party etc. -  and even the areas that remain neutral in other sys­
tems are wastefully swallowed up, even though they not sufficient to cover 
party needs.
When I became Prime Minister, this was the system. I was aware of this, 
and, I have to admit, familiar with it. This was the system, yet some new ele­
ments were permeating it, that were beginning to make things really different. 
The first was that Italians were becoming increasingly fed up with this kind of 
system, which they had accepted in the past, but which they were now no 
longer prepared to accept. Any society is inevitably different fifty years later. In 
a society that has matured, there are professional qualifications, that are rightly 
more important than political affiliations. The uses to which parties had put 
their privileged role had created discrimination, resentment, and public opinion 
no longer considered them as representative of their voice any more, but rather 
as a sort of paramount power. The discovery of systematic corruption and 
bribery, turned the resentment into revolt.
Even though the discovery of corruption exploded like dynamite after the be­
ginning of my term as prime minister, when I took office, I was already aware 
that the old rules could no longer be applied. I was convinced that change was 
necessary. I had said this and written on this subject on more than one occasion 
in previous years. If the parties wanted to save themselves, as essential institu­
tions of any democratic society, then they would have to step out of their gov­
ernment buildings to find their roots once again in public opinion. A political 
party is strong in a democracy, only as long as it listens to the voice of its peo­




























































































of government, the president, or the prime minister. If, on the contrary, I see 
you as a sort of super power that one-sidedly lays down the law, I no longer 
consider you as my representative and you have lost your sight of your origins.
This was my analysis, a very simple one, but all the same, one which is quite 
clear. So, I wanted change, but, as we all know, change does not come easy, es­
pecially when you're dealing with the parties, which expected to be able to 
carry on doing exactly what they had done in the past. The parties expected to 
be called for my major bills, to give me the names of people to be appointed for 
any major role or position in public administration or elsewhere. How then did 
I go about performing my functions? What kind of obstacles had I to over­
come?
Looking back on my experience as a whole, I can see a difference between 
the initial and the final chapters. Initially, I found greater difficulty for me per­
sonally and for my cabinet just to loosen the bonds imposed by these rules. 
After a while, I understood that we were breaking through, and the old rules 
were losing their hold and would eventually be abandoned. So, changes really 
took place in those months. Why did this happen? Was it because we were 
brave and capable of restoring (or perhaps even introducing) in Italy a form of 
authority from within? Or, was it perhaps because political parties were becom­
ing weaker and weaker, and hence were no longer in a position to hold on to 
their power as they had done before?
Well, both interpretations might appear feasible. Most probably, we were 
firm in our resolve to test the Italian Cabinet's capacity to be independent of the 
parties, in the areas where this was necessary. At the same time, however, the 
parties certainly were weaker than they had been before. Let me give you some 
evidence as to the stages of this transition. The first is in relation to the choice 
and appointment of ministers. On 28 June 1992,1 was supposed to go to the 
Quirinale to submit my cabinet nominations to the President of the Republic. 
On that very morning at nine o'clock, Arnaldo Forlani, who at that time was the 
acting General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party, the major party of 
my coalition, entered my apartment with a list of names which I had never 
seen, but, as I came to understand a few hours later, had already been published 
by "La Repubblica" that very morning. Since I always read the newspapers in 
the early afternoon, as a professor, this is a habit that I have never changed, not 
even as Prime Minister, when Forlani appeared, I literally had no idea of what 
had been published by "La Repubblica" that morning. So you might suppose 
that I had no part in choosing those names. I would reach the same conclusion 
too.
However, I discussed the names with Forlani, saying that it would be rather 
difficult for me to propose some of them to the President of the Republic. We 
had a long discussion about this, before I left for the Quirinale, and on the way 




























































































the obstacles that lay ahead seemed quite difficult to overcome. I spent more 
than three hours with Scalfaro, as Italians at that time realized. There were 
many telephones calls; some names disappeared, others were put forward.
When I left to present the final list of cabinet ministers to journalists, I com­
mented (and I quote in Italian): "L'articolo 92 della Costituzione ha avuto una 
qualche applicazione" ("there has been a degree of compliance with article 92 
of the Constitution"). Article 92 states that ministers are proposed by the Prime 
Minister, which means that he makes the substantial choice, and does not there­
fore simply receive a list of names before presenting them to the President of 
the Republic. Indeed, it is true to say that there had been some compliance. I 
had received the list of the Christian Democratic names by Forlani. I had also 
discussed the list of the socialist names with Craxi. I had received the list of 
libera] party names from Renato Altissimo and the social-democrat proposals 
from Carlo Vizzini, the respective General Secretaries of these two minor par­
ties. However, I changed some names with the President of the Republic.
At the beginning, then, this was the new development relating to the forma­
tion of the cabinet: "a degree of compliance with the constitution", had been 
achieved. It was a change, but a very limited one. Towards the end of my expe­
rience, as some of you well know, I had to replace a lot of Ministers, due to the 
tidal wave of Tangentopoli, which was sweeping across Italy, touching my 
Cabinet as well. When I had to replace certain ministers, the role of the 
Secretaries of the parties either became irrelevant, or, as in the case of Nino 
Andreatta, was almost reversed. I wanted Nino Andreatta as Minister of the 
Budget, when I had to replace Franco Reviglio who was taking the position of 
Minister of Finance. So, I called Mino Martinazzoli, then the General Secretary 
of the Christian Democratic Party, to request his assistance in convincing 
Andreatta to accept his nomination. So, you see the difference, I did not receive 
the name from him, but I myself had decided upon this name, and since the 
future appointee was a Christian Democrat, Martinazzoli simply helped me in 
overcoming his initial reluctance.
Then Paolo Baratta entered the Cabinet. Paolo Baratta, as we say in Italian, 
which is difficult to translate in any other language, is "di area socialista", ie. 
not belonging directly to the party, but of socialist persuasions ("area"). Despite 
this, he was not put forward by the socialists. As most of you probably know, I 
had a lot of problems with privatization, because of misunderstandings among 
the three competent ministers, so I wanted a Minister who could form a team 
with the others. Having this in mind, I said to Barucci and Andreatta, "please, 
give me the name of somebody that has your esteem and that you consider as a 
potential member of a team with you, to manage privatization". They gave me 
the name of Baratta, and that's how Baratta was chosen. There again, you can 




























































































The second area of change relates to appointments in state industries. As you 
probably know, we changed the legal status of our state industries, which were 
public entities before my cabinet. By decree, these public entities became pri­
vate corporations overnight: the owner was still the state, but their status be­
came private, making a very fundamental difference, because, from that mo­
ment on, the civil code applied. In practice, this means that, appointments to the 
Boards of Directors are made by General Meeting, which have to be decided 
within fifteen days of their being convoked, without any possibility of post­
ponement. Immediately, after the convocation of General Meetings, telephone 
calls began to pour in from the parties. "Well", they said, "we need time you 
know. Delay the General Meetings". "We cannot any more" we replied, "the 
Civil Code applies now". This was unheard of in Italian politics. According to 
the Civil Code, you can summon a first and a second General Meeting, if nec­
essary, but you cannot extend the deadline initially indicated. Decision-making 
could no longer be avoided.
The parties wanted their experts in the boards of the new companies. They 
were ready to accept that some (but only some) of the names would be 
changed, but they should still remain of that persuasion ("di area"). By the time 
we were notified of the parties' standpoint (I'm quite frank and sincere on this 
point, because I want to give you the sense of the progressive change), we had 
already prepared a compromise for them, by looking for "experts" that had 
never had anything to do with the parties, but whom we knew were to be of 
right persuasion ("di area"). We had made a list of possible names but we were 
not fully satisfied. The outcome was grey, but it was potentially the only com­
patible (and not even entire) solution with which to bargain against the will of 
the parties.
At that point, I went to the Quirinale with my cabinet ministers, and I asked 
the following question to my colleagues and to the President of the Republic: 
"The Constitution of this Republic says that, on matters of policy, we have to 
comply with our majority, otherwise we are outside the rules of our parliamen­
tary system. Now, I don't feel like complying with our parties' will in this case, 
it would be a huge mistake. Should we resign? Is this a matter of policy?" I had 
the answer in my head, but it was my role to keep it there, because with the an­
swer of the Prime Minister at the beginning of the discussion, the discussion is 
over. The right answer, that this is not a matter of policy, was given first by 
Giovanni Goria. The other ministers agreed. The President of the Republic was 
happy that this was our answer, and said, okay, go ahead, and there is no reason 
to have doubts about it.
I went back to Palazzo Chigi with the competent ministers, Guarino, Barucci, 
Reviglio, and we decided upon a common formula: in each of the companies, 
there should be a new board of three members. One embodying continuity -  
i.e., the former chairman; then the former general director; and finally, a gen­




























































































This was a sort of revolution. I shall go into detail here, because, if you want 
my opinion, and this is not only my opinion, the "material" constitution 
changed that very night, and this was the breaking point with the past. When 
we took this decision, I, as Prime Minister, together with the three competent 
ministers, and without saying anything to anybody else, had in fact encroached 
upon the most exclusive prerogative of the political parties, according to the 
pre-existing basic rules of the country. I was so aware of that, that I took a pre­
emptive, but essential measure: the morning after I would disappear. I had 
learnt that, before a difficult decision is finally taken, you are aware of the pres­
sures to which you may be subjected to change your mind, so the best thing you 
can do to step back, to stall -  since you don't know what may happen in human 
relations, not even in your own mind -  or in other words, disappear.
The morning after, as always, I went to Palazzo Chigi, but at eleven o'clock, 
I left the Palazzo in an unknown car, without the police escort which usually in­
dicates the presence of a Prime Minister, and went home unnoticed. I had a lot 
of books in terrible disarray on my shelves, and I wanted to use those few hours 
simply to put them back in some kind of order. I called Palazzo Chigi, and gave 
instructions, that no telephone calls should be put through, except for Minister 
Guarino's call, in the early afternoon. Guarino was supposed to call me, as soon 
as the General Meetings had made their decisions. I divided my time between 
my books and the tv set, watching the final of the ladies tennis singles at the 
Olympic Games, between Aranda Sanchez and Steffi Graf. I am and always 
will be a fan of Steffi Graf, and on this day I had to watch her loosing miserably 
against Arancia Sanchez. And this, happily for me, became my main concern. 
After Steffi lost, Guarino called me, I sent four letters to the secretaries of the 
coalition parties, to inform them of the decision. I said to them that I had con­
sidered it to be in their own interests to step down in this area, and I repeated 
my opinion, that the parties would be well advised to return to the principles of 
a civil society, as we say in Italian, instead of hiding in public buildings. 
Whether this was accepted or not, the decision was taken and nobody chal­
lenged it afterwards. But when I went back to Palazzo Chigi, I was told that, 
during my absence at home, certain under-secretaries of the coalition parties 
had come and inspected my rooms, looking for me hopelessly.
A few months later, when we chose the new president of ENI, I was with my 
ministers consulting "Who's who", just to be sure of the record of single names 
that were passing through our minds. The only qualifications considered, were 
whether this or that person's appointment would lead to a propitious integration 
with the other members of the board, whether the nomination would be accept­
able amongst the sub-holding companies, both in terms of domestic and inter­
national activities. You see, this makes the difference.
I turn briefly now to policy-making -  the third area of change: there were no 
meetings with the experts of the parties, as previously, only consultations with 




























































































ment of our bills. I remember that, in the case of the outlines for the decree re­
forming the public health system, the then Minister of Health, De Lorenzo, held 
a meeting with the experts of the parties and was summarily invited by the 
Prime Minister to stop with these meetings. This is the only case in this area 
that I remember.
With these experiences in mind, I can now go back to answering the ques­
tions I raised earlier, namely: how did the system work with these new relation­
ships amongst the actors? How did the Prime Minister, Ministers, the Cabinet, 
Parliament interact in the new framework that was taking shape?
I tested the new relationship between the Prime Minister and Ministers, with 
a much stronger Prime Minister than had ever been seen before. Of course, it 
would be satisfying for me from a personal point of view, to imagine that this 
new relationship was due to my being a marvellous Prime Minister, but this 
was not necessarily the main reason, and certainly not the only one. At least 
one other factor should be taken into account: the fact that the Ministers no 
longer spoke in the Council as representatives of their parties, as they had done 
in the past. Again, I can clarify this, by pointing to the differences between my 
knowledge of past prime ministers’ experiences and my own.
Let us suppose, for example, that in a previous cabinet -  and this was not my 
case -  a Prime Minister had a policy in mind, and put forward his proposal, and 
I, as a Minister in the cabinet, but belonging to another party, disagreed with it. 
In this case, the Prime Minister would try to persuade me to accept his policy. I 
would be reluctant to do so, and at a certain point, say: "I'm sorry, but it's a po­
litical matter". These words mean that a Cabinet Minister is speaking as a rep­
resentative of one of the parties of the coalition and is simply notifying a veto 
of his party against this kind of policy. At that point, the Prime Minister has to 
stop, to convene the secretaries or other representatives of the parties of the 
coalition, otherwise he cannot proceed. Hence, in this system, a Minister can be 
on an equal footing with the Prime Minister, because he's not representing a 
ministry, but one of the parties of the coalition.
Let us turn now to my case: my ministers came to me and said: "Now, 
Giuliano, this is not a technical matter, this is a political matter, so, please, re­
member that the decision is yours and the responsibility is yours". The words 
are almost the same, but the meaning is totally different. My Ministers saw the 
political profile of the problem, but did not consider it a reason for a political 
veto coming from them. On the contrary, they considered it as a reason to leave 
the decision to me, because I was the Prime Minister. We can draw the 
conclusion that the fact the parties were weaker, and ministers were represent­
ing their own departments and not their parties, gave the relationship between 




























































































As this was in many ways a new relationship between the Cabinet and Par­
liament, because, many things that had previously passed through the parties, 
were now passing through parliamentary groups, which at the same time made 
parliamentary groups more important and the Cabinet more responsible for its 
own decisions. In the former system, the parties had wanted to appose their 
signature to the bottom of every detailed text, before passing it to the Cabinet 
for adoption. Parliamentary groups were influenced by their role in Parliament, 
which was necessarily to mediate, and did not want to be quite so outspoken. 
They wanted the Cabinet to determine the details, and debated them before 
Parliament later on.
On the other hand, there were some new roles, which led to new dichot­
omies. The source of legitimacy of previous cabinets was to be found in the 
parties. What was the source of legitimacy of mine? As far as fiscal policy was 
concerned, I was strong and successful, even in Parliament, when I could rely 
upon the backing of trade unions and entrepreneurs: social consensus was re­
placing allegiance to the parties. As to other decisions, those which were more 
inherently political in nature, the Cabinet was subject to the supportive tutelage 
of a new, informal constitutional body, which is not provided for by the Con­
stitution, the members of which were, and probably still are, the President of 
the Republic and the Presidents of the two Chambers. This is a very peculiar 
feature of the transition, as to which I can give no more than a tentative expla­
nation. At the beginning, the parties had been recognized as the pillars of the 
system, in so far as they were the first and most direct representatives of the 
community. Now they were no longer accepted by that community, yet still, on 
the basis of our unchanged democratic values, it was essential to maintain a 
connecting link with this sentiment. This connecting link was identifiable 
through the President of the Republic, together with the Presidents of the two 
Chambers, for the simple reason that they were above the parties, and as far 
removed possible from them.
Whether this sort of de facto evolution is compatible with the principle of ac­
countability, by no means a minor requirement in a democracy, is questionable. 
What is clear to me is that it has a precedent in the bold initiatives of President 
Pertini, that, after some years, appear as the first signs of the parties' crisis. The 
one time President realized that he had been allowed to do what he had done, 
because he had represented public opinion more than the parties themselves. 
And this had created a precedent, one which was initially not understood in re­
lation to the events in these last months.
I now go to my final point. My experience was the experience of a transition. 
Will something of it remain in the future? This could be said to be the crux of 
my presentation. I would say that a Cabinet devised by the Constitution, as a 
body without an inner authority, and dependent on the external support of polit­
ical parties, has succeeded in finding a new capability and new effective roles 




























































































tween the executive and parliament. Political support for its legitimacy has 
been weak and a more stabilized system will have to sustain it. Can this be 
achieved, whilst at the same time preserving the positive features which 
emerged during the transition? Or must we presume that the new parties, be­
cause there will be new parties, will be the same as they were in the past? Will 
these areas of institutional authority be submerged again by the paramount 
power and authority of the parties, or will something remain? Will the peculiar 
role of the President of the Republic still be accepted or will he, too, have to 
restrain his role again, while the system finds new legitimacy?
Personally, I think that some of these transitional features should remain as 
part of the future. And I am also inclined to believe that a return to the past 
would encounter many difficult obstacles put in place by my own reforms: 
consider, for instance, the privatization of public companies, and how it poten­
tially limits the possibility of future encroachment by the parties. Of course, the 
answer will also depend upon the structure and the conduct of these parties. 
One only has to think of the Lombard League in this respect, with its central­
ized bureaucratic structures, of its links with "representatives" in local govern­
ment, and in Parliament. This leads me to the conclusion that Italians who do 
not believe in this kind of party, would consider the previous fifty years as a 























































































































































































Present problems of Europe
Europe today is faced with a disconcerting paradox. The Maastricht Treaty is 
going to take effect in just a few days, on November 1st. The process of 
ratification was extremely difficult but it has been completely achieved. This is 
indeed a great success. At the same time, precisely when we are congratulating 
ourselves on the foundation of the European Union, we are forced into the 
realization that Europe is also breaking apart. How do we explain such a 
paradox?
When the Treaty was signed two years ago, some of my colleagues, profes­
sors of constitutional law, decided that the era of national constitutions had 
come to an end, and invited students, junior lecturers and young researchers to 
abandon these anachronisms and devote themselves to the new and only consti­
tution which deserved their attention from then on; the European one, the main 
elements of which had already been embodied as a treaty.
Those were the expectations of two years ago. I am left wondering whether 
these young scholars are about to publish now what they started researching 
upon two years ago. It would be disconcertingly anachronistic, given the pre­
sent circumstances.
What then has happened in these two years? Let us first consider the goals - 
there are basically three of them - that we were pursuing years ago. We were 
pursuing monetary union, which, in the eighties, became the main tenet of the 
advance towards European integration, which was supposed to take place, fol­
lowing this period of transition with fixed exchange rates. However, now, in­
stead of having a more complete monetary integration, we have a very peculiar 
European Monetary System (EMS), in which some currencies float out and 
some others float in 15% fluctuation bands, which suggest anything but inte­
gration. At this moment in time, one would tend to believe that monetary inte­
gration seems capable of survival only by denial of the very principles govern­
ing its conception.
At one time, we were pursuing political integration, and that was perhaps ul­
timately the long term goal of the founding fathers of the European Community. 
Of course, this goal was to be reached by a flexible process on step by step ba­
sis. Nobody expected sudden and immediate integration amongst twelve coun­
tries with different languages, histories and traditions, but the process was in­




























































































ever, we have been going in the opposite direction, bowing to the pressures of 
national and sub-national differences. Instead of seeing more integration at the 
European level, we are simply witnessing less integration both at national and 
European levels. The principle of subsidiarity, as has been the case with other 
integration-oriented concepts, is being interpreted as the basis for strengthening 
national jurisdictions, rather than finding the justification for extended 
Community jurisdiction. The upshot of this trend is less Brussels, and more of 
our national diversities, a phenomenon which is very similar to grassroots or 
pro-local movements which are typical of some federal systems. They are now 
proliferating throughout many European countries.
We were also pursuing economic growth, our third main expectation of 
European integration. I remind you that this was the main argument used in 
convincing Europeans to accept some limitations to the sovereignty of national 
jurisdictions, and reduce the significance of national boundaries: with the single 
market we will have wonderful growth together, our economies will improve, 
this will create more jobs, a higher rate of growth, better industrial output for all 
of us, goods and services throughout the whole Community. The results to date 
tell a different story: we have negative rates of growth, a rate of unemployment 
which has never been seen in the past, currently at an average of more than 10 
percent, and still growing in individual countries. This is quite shocking.
So, what is happening in Europe? Precisely the opposite to what we originally 
set out to do. Instead of moving progressively towards integration, monetary 
union and growth, we are going towards disintegration, a monetary mess, in­
creasing unemployment, and less growth.
If we read the explanations given for this unhappy phase which Europe is 
passing through, then opinions tend to oscillate between two poles, as if one 
opposed the other (although this is not necessarily the case), which I'll now 
briefly explain.
On the one hand, the first body of opinion claims that the present state of af­
fairs in Europe can be explained as the product of a combination of events: the 
end of communism, of German reunification, and of new events which had not 
been foreseen, that lead to new tension, which rocked the sturdy foundations on 
which Europe had been built. We were in the process of building a very beauti­
ful Europe, and there was basically nothing wrong with our action. It is not our 
fault that communism broke down, nor that the reunification of Germany took 
place, that being one of the factors which pushed us towards integration and to­
wards Maastricht, and later became one of the sources of economic and political 
difficulties. Neither are we to blame for economic recession, coupled with the 
overwhelming strength of financial markets which disrupted the EMS, bringing 
higher levels of unemployment. Intervening factors, and not the claim of pre­




























































































On the other hand, the other explanation denies that the Europe we were 
building was a healthy one. Rather, it was a sick Europe, and had been so for 
years, but you, as Europeans, as the builders of Europe, could not afford to ad­
mit that there were already failures, ambiguities, flaws, loopholes going as far 
back as its foundation stones. Of course, the intervening factors might have 
triggered off a cycle of disruption, but they are not the reason for it. The reasons 
lie in Europe itself.
Both explanations clearly apply, because there are elements of truth in both. 
And obviously, one cannot choose one explanation to the exclusion of the other. 
One must strike a balance between the two.
My position tends more towards the hypothesis that Europe was sick already, 
that it is quite possible that without the intervening factors (the end of commu­
nism, recession, etc.) our sickness would have remained ignored as before for I 
don't know how many years, but in any case, it was there already. And 
Europeans must have the courage to admit this, because if they don't, it will be 
quite difficult for them to make headway in the construction of a healthier 
Europe in the future.
Let us now examine the inner defects of the European construction. Jacques 
Delors once said, or perhaps even on several occasions, that European history, 
for the last thirty years, has and still is hiding behind a mask. This statement is 
basically true, for reasons which mainly relate to the political compromise be­
tween very different standpoints on the future direction of Europe. We never 
did clearly state where we wanted to go. Great Britain was mostly in favour of a 
free trade area, but no more than that; the others mostly in favour of political 
integration, which meant building not only a common market, but also political 
institutions with sovereign powers. But this was not the only divergence. Let us 
not forget France, that initially wanted the nascent Community to provide the 
solution to the German problem as France saw it after World War Two. But it 
was only after a few years of the Mitterrand Presidency that France became a 
strong supporter of political integration. For a long time it had been loyal to the 
position taken by the former President, Charles De Gaulle, of "l'Europe des 
patries". Obviously then, no common goal was ever laid down, because that 
common goal did not exist.
This basic ambiguity is reflected, as you know, by the basic "imbroglio" (and 
the Italian word is the only one that fits which means something akin to "de­
ceit"), that we have in treaties and in the relations within the Community. We 
have been talking for several years now of increasing integration, yet what has 
really been increasing is intergovernmental cooperation, which is quite a dif­
ferent kettle of fish. Admittedly, the bureaucracies in Brussels have been busy 
pumping out hundreds of papers, but the contents of their publications, rather 
than reflecting common actions to be taken upon decision by a single European 




























































































states and their government representatives of the member States. And this 
"imbroglio" is more visible than anywhere else in the Maastricht Treaty. Just 
read it for yourselves! It is supposed to be the basis of the European Union. It 
was advertised universally as the Treaty widening the jurisdiction of the 
Community to new areas: research, social affairs, culture, immigration from 
third countries. I implore you to count just precisely how many common actions 
are provided for in these new chapters of Community jurisdiction. There are 
very few at all; mostly, you only find that it provides intergovernmental cooper­
ation, and this in the Maastricht Treaty, after all. Again, for those who are famil­
iar with the history of the Community, you'll be little surprised to discover this. 
Many years ago, one of the main goals of the Community was the harmoniza­
tion of our national legislations in as many fields as possible. After tiresome and 
often fruitless negotiation, the harmonization platform was sharply curtailed and 
it was decided instead, that the main thrust for future development in the 
European legal framework would be mutual recognition. This was an enormous 
change in tactics. Mutual recognition means that beyond the threshold of com­
mon principles, each country is free to have more rigid regulations than others 
and to take the consequences of such regulation. The clearest example of this is 
in the area of taxation: why should we have common brackets for VAT? 
Instead, why not decide minimum levels, and allow any of our countries have 
higher brackets for its own products? Dumping will be avoided while the prod­
ucts with higher VAT rates will be less competitive and the market forces will 
be self-regulatory and in the end bring about uniformity. This made sense, in 
principle, but it meant that, without admitting it openly, we were passing from a 
declared aim of "political integration" approach to an unspoken "free trade area" 
approach, since harmonization was consistent with the former case, whilst mu­
tual recognition implies acceptance of the latter.
Another form of "imbroglio" lay in the self-deceit amongst fellow Europeans, 
in relation to their expectations of Europe. They somewhat light-heartedly 
imagined that Europe would become one of the great protagonists of interna­
tional politics, in a new international order. In a multipolar world, Europe had 
all the assets to become one of the leaders. At the same time, Europeans 
wanted, and were promised that Europe would give them a more comfortable 
habitat than they were being given in their national countries. This was based on 
the credo, that if your country can't provide you with what you need, then 
Europe will make up the difference. TTiis was necessary and correct, as far as 
structural funds, cohesion funds, and lending support to weaker areas, were 
concerned. The fact is that our citizens were told that Europe would make them 
richer and happier, and that they would have more.
Now, if you want to be a leader of the world, you need to be richer, but you 
must also give more, not simply have more, and in this sense, there is a certain 
degree of inconsistency between a Europe that takes the responsibilities of 
world leadership, and Europe that wants primarily a better welfare state for all 




























































































practice, it has been seen by the terrible mess we have made in relation to the 
former Yugoslavia, where, inevitably, according to our prevailing cultural stan­
dards, the potential suffering that might be caused to the mothers of our sol­
diers, was much more important than our desire to act as leaders. American sol­
diers, too, have mothers. I am by no means making a statement to the effect that 
any military action of the Americans around the world is justified, but what I’m 
saying does imply that, if you want to become a leader in this very difficult 
world, there comes a moment when you must spend your money and take on 
the risks of leadership. If you don't want to risk anything, you will never be a 
leader.
What have Europeans done to date in former Yugoslavia? Until now, they 
have remained comfortably seated in their armchairs, and been terribly moved 
by television images, reporting on the mothers and children killed, tortured or 
wounded in shelling and cross-fire, and have become eager to accept in their 
hospitals in Italy, in France, in Great Britain, mostly children, possibly mothers, 
because we're more easily moved to compassion for them. At the same time, not 
one of our countries has been ready to send 10.000 men necessary to provide 
real guarantees of safe humanitarian outlets.
Let us turn now to consider monetary integration, the EMS. What has become 
of this? One of the foremost Italian writers on this subject, Tommaso Padoa 
Schioppa, has written on more than one occasion, that the EMS is based upon 
what he calls the inconsistent quartet: free trade, free movement of capital, fixed 
exchange rates, national monetary policies. It is, in fact, an inconsistent quartet, 
which we have lived with for many years, but one which could not work on a 
long term basis. Free movement of capital means that money can be transferred 
immediately and in whatever quantity required for a particular transaction, and 
wherever those who know how to earn it, wish to send it. How can Central 
Banks resist, with the far more limited resources available to them? And how 
can fixed exchange rates coexist alongside national monetary policies which put 
the existing parities under continuous strain? I am not saying that monetary in­
tegration is wrong, although here I closely follow the arguments of Milton 
Friedman, when he criticized the EMS. He was right to do so, in so far as he ob­
jected to fixed exchange rates, but monetary integration is another thing. It 
should mean a single currency, and a single currency goes beyond the argu­
ments of Milton Friedman, who simply points out the inconsistencies in our 
mechanism.
Now, this very shaky Europe would have been capable of holding its ground, 
if only some of those factors stabilizing it had remained unchanged. First of all, 
the existence of communism, that had at least kept all of us united. We still 
aren't really capable of assessing the effects of the end of communism through­
out Europe and in each of our countries. The previous fundamental division, the 
rigid ideological dichotomy, requiring us to make absolute choices, either one 




























































































tion that there were many differences waiting to spring up, to claim recognition, 
that would bring about new conflicts. We are now having to facing up to this 
new harsh reality.
A second factor relates to the process towards free trade as a domestic process 
of Europe (and by domestic, I mean within the Twelve). This, too, has helped us 
to remain united, but from the moment the GATT negotiations made it clear 
that free trade was something that we should also extend to third countries, even 
the wonderful idea of Europe became less enchanting to many Europeans, and 
the old evil, defence of national interests, was once again unearthed.
The third factor, and perhaps more important than any other, concerns the 
steady and continuous growth we enjoyed throughout the entire decade of the 
eighties. Growth made the anti-inflationary policy of the Bundesbank the source 
of a virtuous circle, which embraced the other European countries, without 
causing negative consequences in them. Inevitably, the rate of growth of 
European countries, whilst steady, was lower than elsewhere, but this was partly 
due to the fact that they were forced by the strength of the DM to adopt mea­
sures designed to prevent inflationary expansion and to keep interests rates gen­
erally higher than in other parts of the world. But it worked, because inflation 
was held at bay and public spending was kept under tighter control. This strong 
position soon developed into a vicious circle with the onset of recession, further 
exacerbated by German reunification.
Initially, the effect of German reunification was positive, due to the invest­
ment that poured into the Eastern Laender, delaying the recession, which had al­
ready begun on the other side of the Atlantic. Shortly afterwards, however, the 
recession hit Europe as well. At that point, we were still caught up in the anti- 
inflationary policy of the Bundesbank, which it now needed much more than in 
the past. For the first time, the Germans themselves were faced with a real risk 
of inflation, and they needed capital more than in the past. So, they introduced 
high interests rates on their part, which necessarily meant higher interest rates 
on our part to keep up with the DM. Not only Italy was forced to do this, but 
also France, whose economy had healthier fundamentals than the Italian ones. 
When this happened, the inconsistent quartet opened the flood gates to a wave 
of speculation, which sought easy gain by weakening single currencies, with 
drastic effects on the system of parities which could no longer stand up to such 
pressure.
Many economists will tell you that in such a case, speculation had to be 
countered, because the market was wrong. They will also tell you that it was 
unreasonable to defend the Italian Lira, because the Italian fundamentals did not 
justify such a high parity, but that it was only dirty speculation to attack the 





























































































Well, I share the principle that central banks should defend the currencies of 
countries that are attacked for sheerly speculative reasons, whilst currencies 
with weak fundamentals should not be defended with the same tenacity. But 
does this mean that the market was misguided or stupid when it also attacked 
the French Franc? My point is that the market had good reason, from its own 
viewpoint, for doing what it did. The market realized that, with an increasing 
recession and ensuant rise in unemployment, those interests rates were simply 
too high. Countries that were forced, as expected, to do something against un­
employment, could not perform this task, under the pressure of such high inter­
est rates, and if they wanted lower rates, they could not defend their parities. 
This was sensed by the market, and that's also why the French Franc was at­
tacked, and why we had all this gigantic turmoil on European financial markets.
These then, were the fragile pillars upon which Europe had set about building 
its integrated society. Its fragility is the reason why it could not stand up to the 
burden of the difficult times we had entered by the turn of the decade; this led 
inevitably to the regeneration of a strong anti-European sentiment amongst its 
peoples. But before dealing with this final point, I shall go into some detail 
about some of the arguments I have just touched upon, and share some of my 
own experiences with you.
I will first say something more about the financial market and the devalua­
tions of 1992. When I became Minister for the Treasury in 1987, the Italian Lira 
was under heavy attack. It was early September, and I remember Carlo Azeglio 
Ciampi, who was governor of our central bank at that time, calling me some­
what perplexed, and telling me: "Today we spent an enormous amount of 
money defending the Lira". "How much?", I retorted. Silence. Then, after a 
while, and with a broken voice, came the answer, "One billion dollars". Well, as 
you can imagine, this seemed an enormous amount even to me, one billion dol­
lars in just one single day to defend the lira. Happily for us, at that time we still 
had administrative controls on currencies and on financial flows. We managed 
to repel that attack in three days and the Lira recovered very easily. Five years 
later, in September 1992, I was Prime Minister and Carlo Ciampi was still 
Governor of the Bank of Italy. The scenario repeated itself, the same calls, the 
same broken voice as five years earlier. How much a day this time? The answer 
was "Five billion dollars," "seven billion dollars". And later on, the Bundesbank 
spent even more than twenty billion dollars per day to defend the pound.
Keep these figures in mind. They give you an idea of the enormously in­
creased power of the market and confirm once more that in the mid-ground 
between flexible rates and single currency there is no safe territory. Even if I 
had not been aware of it, I could not escape this realization, when September 
came, and experience repeated itself. It was Friday when we were called from 
Frankfurt, and told, politely but frankly, that from the following Monday it 
would be difficult to continue exchanging Marks for Lira at the current rates, 




























































































to keep us in the limits. Our answer was: "Didn't we sign the Nyborg agreement 
together, according to which, when one of our members reaches the margin of 
the band, there would be an unlimited level of support by all the other central 
banks?" "Yes", they replied, "but this unlimited support cannot last for ever, and 
you are on the way to needing it for ever". Our reply was that, "We have a polit­
ical deadline to respect, the 20th of September, when our French friends have 
their referendum on Maastricht, and they asked to all of us to avoid realign­
ments before that date, because it would be politically destabilizing for the ex­
pected "yes vote". The Bundesbank were aware of the problem, but remained 
firm, declaring that they were ready to make a reasonable agreement. And so in 
the early morning of Saturday 12 September, two officials left Frankfurt and 
Bonn, and went to Paris, before continuing to Rome, where a provisional bilat­
eral agreement was reached.
Under this agreement, that would have to be shared by the others, the DM 
would have been revaluated by 3 points, the Lira devaluated by 3 points, and 
the other currencies could find new parities somewhere in between those mar­
gins. These were the premises for the event that everyone was expecting: an 
extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors for the Monday following the 
Bundesbank's scheduled reduction of the Lombard rate and the official rate.
We were satisfied, and started calling our colleagues in the other capitals. 
"Well, listen friends", we said, "this is a good deal, are you ready to accept it?". 
The French government considered it an "imperative" that the parity of the 
Franc should not be touched before the referendum (and even after it). John 
Major said to me that there was no reason for the Pound to devaluate and con­
cluded the telephone conversation with a "Good luck, Giuliano", that I still have 
in my ears. Not even Gonzales wanted to touch the Peseta, which was already 
having great problems. I was sure that some of them were making a mistake: 
the reduction of the German interest rates would have been more significant, 
had they devaluated their parities vis-à-vis the Mark. Speculation would con­
tinue and stability would not be reduced. But I was powerless: incredibly 
enough, most of the other currencies remained firmly attached to the DM and 
were revaluated by the same 3 points. The Lira remained alone in its devalua­
tion.
It was quite a hard moment for me, and two days after, when I saw the Pound, 
after heavy attacks, passing before my very eyes and plummeting down and out 
of the EMS, I remained silent, but you can believe me, it was something that I 
had predicted. The monetary system was breaking up.
I want to give you some more details as to the reasons behind the violent re­
action of public opinion, against what appeared to be too a centralized Europe. 
Was this really a problem coming from Brussels? People pointed their finger 
accusingly at Brussels - all those regulations coming from Brussels - an enor­




























































































and often irrelevant affairs. The conclusion they drew from it, was that Europe 
was being choked by a huge bureaucracy, but this was not necessarily the case.
Of course, there’s the case, as Jacques Delors has pointed out more than once, 
of an EC Directive which dictates the distance at which pigs must be kept from 
each other during truck transportation, not only in intra-European movement, 
but also in domestic transportation. I'm an animal lover myself, so I have noth­
ing against making pigs comfortable when they are being transported, but a 
European regulation for this seems a little extreme. However, this Directive did 
not come from the bureaucrats of Brussels, but had been decided by 
Environment Ministers of our national States, who had been ready to accept 
whatever idea came from the green movement throughout Europe. Had they 
made the proposal at the national level, each of them would have faced objec­
tions, or even opposition by other ministers, as this naturally happens in every 
Cabinet, where different public interests are represented. Being alone in 
Brussels, the Environment Ministers could take their decisions without 
obstacles.
In Brussels, we have a rather peculiar Council of Ministers that brings only 
ministers sharing the same competencies around the table, which means that 
these people have the enormous satisfaction of taking decisions about whatever 
they have in mind without having to deal with the interference of their col­
leagues at national level. The first consequence is that countries that would 
throw out certain proposals at national level, find themselves forced to accept 
them in Brussels, because all the Ministers of Agriculture meet without the 
presence of the Ministers for the Environment, or vice versa, and establish their 
unilateral rules with as many details as possible, taking full advantage of the 
opportunities befalling them: these are magic moments you would never even 
dream of in your own country. The second consequence is that the Community 
jurisdiction has in some areas expanded beyond its reasonable limits.
The picture of Europe, as seen by the eyes of public opinion, is now com­
plete: unhappily, it is a contradictory and gloomy one.
People believe that there is too much of Europe, due to this disturbing image 
of excessive centralization, without this being effectively the case, which has 
given rise to the sometimes uncompromising and arrogant reassertion of na­
tional, regional and sometimes ethnic identities.
On the other hand, there is too little of Europe, as has been seen in monetary 
policy and even more poignantly in the former Yugoslavia. Europe was sup­
posed to be a leader and, yet it turned out to be impotent, with its ministers leap­
frogging from one capital to another, without really getting anywhere loss 




























































































And then there's the excessive cost of Europe, because of the recession, be­
cause of the severe policies brought about by the realignment of monetary pol­
icy, because of the higher competition after the predictable conclusions of the 
GATT negotiations (I recall the fierce and sometimes violent protest of French 
farmers). When our citizens are told, that to be part of Europe, they must accept 
this, they must loose that, they must pay for this and that, their final reaction 
might reasonably be that, "Europe can go to hell, this Europe, why should I be 
part of into it?"
I want to conclude by commenting briefly on the recent decision of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) in relation to the rat­
ification of the Maastricht Treaty, which demonstrates that the mood has 
changed, and not only in public opinion. As we all know, the principle accepted 
by national courts throughout Europe, is that Community regulations take 
precedence over national statutes and rules as long as they do not infringe the 
fundamental principles of our national constitutions. That is the basic guideline 
given to national judiciaries at any rate, and one which has given Community 
legislation undisputed priority over national laws. The German Constitutional 
Court, however, advanced another principle two weeks ago, stating that 
Community legislation could prevail, provided that they comply with the prin­
ciple of subsidiarity and did not go beyond it. What does this mean? It means 
that the German Constitutional Court - but I suppose any other national court 
with jurisdiction to interpret Community provisions for that matter - will scruti­
nize each Community regulation and will accept it, only after hearing evidence 
to the effect that it would not be effective if adopted at the national level. With 
this precedent, one of the very pillars of the existing European integration might 
now be endangered, since the principle of subsidiarity might be interpreted 
more and more to express a reverse trend towards an unforeseen formula for 
European (dis)integration.
This is where Europe has come to at the moment. Europe, as I said, had in­
veterate weaknesses to its structure, that had been hidden for too long. Let us 
face reality as it is now, and aim from this point on towards a clearer and 
healthier Europe. Is it still possible? Are not we closer to disintegration than to 



























































































Prospects for the construction of a European Union
I closed my previous talk, promising that next time I'd take a closer look at 
the question of "where we might go from here”. I've been able to lay my hands 
upon a lecture given by George Soros to Aspen Berlin at the end of September, 
entitled, "Prospects for European disintegration". George Soros, as you know, is 
considered a Guru of the financial world. He became very famous a few months 
ago in Europe, as the presumed protagonist of the devaluation of the British 
Pound, by betting heavily against it and pushing it out of the EMS. After that 
experience, he said that he had chosen not speculate against the French Franc, 
because he did not want to be considered an enemy of Europe. And he gave this 
quite interesting lecture, which is by no means discouraging, as you might be 
inclined to believe from his basic argument: the peak of the process of integra­
tion in Europe was reached, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Now we 
are in a process which seems more like disintegration than integration, but it is 
always possible to reverse this trend, because it is similar to being on a 
mountain peak, where you could either fall down one side or the other.
To demonstrate the nature of this process, Soros points to the same situations 
we analysed in the previous lecture, namely, recession and unemployment. 
Recession and unemployment bring social unrest and also political discontent, 
neither of which favour a process of integration. On the contrary, they put pres­
sure individual countries to take care of their national interests, and to ignore 
European views.
Secondly, and obviously from this point of view, that the crisis of the EMS, 
might even accentuate the divergencies between our economies. The crisis 
needs cooperation, the actual cure for which might be competition, competitive 
devaluations, competitive interest rates and so on.
The third factor concerns the weakening of the European construction vis-à- 
vis the problem of enlargement and the interest of single countries in retaining 
their own individual status inside the Community, the danger of creating an "à la 
carte Europe", as was stated after the Danish compromise had been reached in 
Edinburgh, that might be extended to other countries. This danger could be 
minimali sed by a strong united Europe and, on the other hand, could be com­
pounded by a weak one.
The fourth element underlined by Soros relates to instability of countries sur­



























































































instability within the Community, and heightens diversities within. Let 
ak back to the mistakes of the Community vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia
j  how the recognition of Croatia by Germany, and then Slovenia by other 
countries, contributed to the creation of different foreign policies, to the detri­
ment of developing a common one. Why is this so important? Because European 
countries tend to have differing positions, which can undoubtedly be explained 
by a long tradition of diversity, of vitality through diversity. I suppose that most 
of you have read the outstanding book by Paul Kennedy, "The Rise and Fall of 
Great Powers", which underlines the differences between: on the one hand, 
countries such as India or China covering a huge surface area, but dominated by 
single dynasties, that after a while were doomed to decay, because such vast 
empires did not have the necessary vitality to keep up with change and de­
velopment; on the other hand, there's the case of Europe, above all, mostly 
Western Europe, whose peoples hid in their valleys, and thus nobody ever suc­
ceeded in conquering the entire continent. Here continuous competition became 
the main source of modern civilization, of industrialization, of growth. This is, 
of course, the very general background to Europe, but it is important to keep it 
in mind, because whenever the process of integration loses momentum and in­
stability prevails, the aged figure of our historical diversity is resurrected. And 
each country defends itself.
The final point is referred to by Soros as the emotional amplifier. When 
things go wrong, there is an emotional amplifier, that makes the negative trends 
stronger than they actually are, charging the public with irrational emotion, 
which eventually becomes part of public policy. The example given by Soros, 
and not only by him, relates to the French reaction to the United States, follow­
ing the inevitable devaluation of the French Franc. After devaluation, it would 
have been rational to admit that interest rates were too high, given the high level 
of unemployment and the urgent need of less restrictive policies. The market 
was aware of this and it made the French position in the EMS weaker than its 
economic fundamentals actually indicated. But the French Government and the 
French press preferred a totally different explanation. They openly denounced 
an Anglo-American conspiracy against France and the Franc, as symptomatic of 
the cultural invasion propagated by the Americans in Europe, with their movies 
and their soap operas, which had been courageously combatted by former 
Minister Lang and other open-minded Europeans. "Who could ever imagine that 
respected officials would really believe in an Anglo-American conspiracy?" 
This is a question that brings home the far-reaching potential of the so-called 
"emotional amplifier".
These were the factors, then, in Soros' mind, that might lead us to disintegra­
tion. I am personally convinced that: a) this is possible, but not inevitable; b) we 
can still reverse the trend; c) a high standard of political leadership is needed to 
do it; d) there should be three main thrusts to our action: the first one is 
strengthening the EMS, the second, is the adoption of common actions with the 




























































































agree upon the institutional changes necessary to get rid of the absurd dilemma 
about "too much of Europe/ too little of Europe", which we are caught up in at 
the moment.
The first area: the EMS. The recent experience has forced us to accept that 
fixed exchange rates are not tenable for a long time, given the current structural 
basis to free movement of capital. In the long run, market forces are stronger. 
Consequently, either we go back to flexible exchange rates or we go rapidly to­
wards a single currency. My choice would be to go rapidly towards a single 
currency, accepting two points that have never been accepted to date: the first 
one is that the complete elimination of economic divergencies is not a pre-req­
uisite, the second, is that a special role will have to be accorded to the 
Bundesbank in the European System of Central Banks.
Divergency was an argument that embarrassed me years ago, when I was 
representing the country with the highest public debt, and others, namely 
Germany, were probably thinking that I saw the single currency as a comfort­
able way of having them pay my debts. Today, divergencies are spreading 
throughout Europe, Germany itself is involved, and their real importance might 
be assessed less unilaterally. With a single currency, divergent countries would 
only be able to attract capital for their bonds if they were free to increase their 
domestic interest rates. Would they really be free to do this if a European 
Central Bank operated effectively? Will it not occur to them, that if they do not 
make their domestic costs more flexible, that they will be abandoned by the 
market?
Of course, given Europe today, we cannot imagine a European Central Bank 
with the Bundesbank having more than a twelfth share in decision-making. We 
have to be realistic about this and presume that the Bundesbank will never be 
satisfied with only having being chosen as the model for the new institution. "It 
makes all the difference in the world" and this is my last quotation from Soros' 
lecture in Berlin, "whether you service the model or whether you are actually in 
charge, and that is what the Bundesbank has actually in mind". The problem has 
a solution. When the Federal Reserve was created in the U.S., the New York 
Reserve already had a paramount role in the country. It is also true that it never 
lost it, not even afterwards. That role is still formally and substantially recog­
nized in the Federal System and we could find a good precedent for it in our 
future.
These are difficult obstacles, as you can see, that a strong European leader­
ship (I insist on this) might be able to overcome. Is there a way to do it? Here, I 
can submit to you at any rate a foreseeable economic trend and a proposal, both 
of which might help.
What we can foresee is that Italy, France and Great Britain, all of whom want 




























































































which could in turn force Germany to lower its own rates. At the same time, en­
couraging predictions for recovery might be heard increasingly from America. 
In a couple of years, this could create a totally different atmosphere throughout 
Europe, an atmosphere - take note of this - created not by European cooperation, 
but by what reality gives us now, competitive political economies by single 
countries, and yet encouraging the return to an optimistic view for future con­
vergence through growth. At this point, the step forward to a single currency 
could be decided overnight.
In the meantime, the way for this process has to be prepared and, here, my 
proposal comes to the question of the correct and effective role of the European 
Monetary Institute, that is expected to initiate its activity from the beginning of 
1994.
Article 109 (f) of the Maastricht Treaty states that the Institute should 
strengthen the cooperation between central banks and strengthen the coordina­
tion of monetary policies of member States, with a view to achieving price sta­
bility. Now, this is something that should be given an actual meaning, beyond 
the words of the Treaty. This would probably require strong political support by 
the heads of the European Governments, because, believe me, central banks 
have to be independent of the executives of their countries, yet at the same time, 
they cannot be left to their own devices. What has to be avoided is a restrictive 
interpretation of Article 109 (f) of the Treaty, which might limit the scope of the 
Institute to the compilation of documents and other bureaucratic duties for a 
further stage, that might never arrive. The second stage will be useful only if 
used with the clear and firm goal of preparing a single currency and conse­
quently, with the necessary political will for giving cooperation and coordina­
tion the opportunity to succeed.
The second area: common actions. Here, it is more evident that we have the 
opportunity to reverse the trend by using the existing tools we have in our hands 
to date, namely, principle of subsidiarity. In the last couple of years the principle 
of subsidiarity has been used to reduce integration, and to give powers back to 
the member States. You wouldn't have the Danish exception today without this 
interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, nor the widespread opinion that 
Community directives and regulations are excessive. Why don't we consider 
subsidiarity from the opposite point of view, that is, as the principle that allows 
us to decide at the European level, the common actions clearly understood by 
any European citizen, because they are useful to him, and it is only at the 
European level that they can be adopted? This means two things: taking away a 
great part of the present Community decision-making powers, and concentrating 
on just a very few of them, but also allowing the Community to adopt common 
actions in these limited matters.
Those who are familiar with the growth of federal states, know that such 




























































































commerce clause of the US constitution, which simply allows Congress to regu­
late goods that are passing through the channels of interstate commerce? At the 
beginning of the century, when the first social issues, such as the question of 
permitted daily working hours of women and children, could no longer be ig­
nored, no member state dared to take the initiative, because if New York did it 
and Massachusetts did not, the products of New York would have been less 
competitive. At that point, Congress stepped in, there were initial difficulties, 
but at the end, even die States accepted a broad interpretation of the interstate 
commerce clause, because it was convenient for them to do so. Only Congress, 
with its superior level, could adopt that uniform regulation which put all of 
them, and all their industries, on the same footing.
Now, this would be a wonderful way of taking advantage of the principle of 
subsidiarity, and we could do the same in areas that create similar problems for 
us: immigration is the first area, social protection might be regarded as another. 
I'm touching upon very controversial issues, and courage is needed to regulate 
them at the European level. That's why, I repeat, without true political leader­
ship nothing of what I am saying can come true. This is the only way you can 
convince Europeans that Europe is useful.
None of us can regulate immigration unilaterally in a continent where free­
dom of movement is guaranteed from country to country. We have already had 
difficulties with each other; Italy was more flexible than France years ago. 
Germany had a very broad concept of political asylum, which was changed very 
recently. The United Kingdom is and wants to remain more rigid than others. It 
should be clear that this is the typical case where a regulation could only be ef­
fective, if it were uniformly applied, and therefore adopted at the Community 
level.
Secondly, and this area is even more difficult: social protection. One of the 
basic reasons for the reduced competitiveness of the European industries vis-à- 
vis the Far Eastern, and in some ways the American ones, is due to the level of 
our social protection. Social protection is part of our culture, of our history, of 
our common feelings throughout the Continent. We are rightly determined to 
preserve it. However, with the increase of our average income, a growing num­
ber of us must be called to use private savings to preserve that protection which 
presently depends mostly on public budgets. It is unreasonable to care for the 
same percentage of the total population that was cared for when our incomes 
were much lower than they are now through public expenditure. Can any of our 
countries intervene in this area alone? Isn't it better for all of us to define a ho­
mogenous level of social protection and to establish it from the Community 
level? As with immigration, this is equally a European problem, because it is a 
problem that concerns the competitiveness of European industry.
There might be also a third area of common European action, albeit quite 




























































































common European identity: European citizens' rights. As Europeans, we have to 
believe in a common identity, and individual rights are of enormous value. 
Again, we have to rely upon subsidiarity, and create rights of European citizens 
that mean something, and that will not attenuate national identities, but add to it, 
establishing new and more substantive rights. By using the example of America 
again, you should remember how important it was for all those people coming 
from different countries, from different cultures, from different religions and 
ethnic groups to be Americans and to be identified as such through the new in­
dividual rights they were entitled to as American citizens. This gave enormous 
momentum to the American identity in the first decades of the century. Can we 
imagine something similar, even if on a reduced scale, in Europe?
The right to vote where you are a resident is provided for by the Maastricht 
Treaty. A lot of, let's say, "random rights" have been established through juris­
diction of the European courts based on previously enacted European legisla­
tion. What about a sort of bill of rights added to the Treaty, that might also in­
clude a summary of the existing rights, to the effect of giving our citizens the 
immediate feeling that they gain something from being Europeans?
This brings me to the third and final area: institutional changes that might 
usefully be prepared by the Intergovernmental Conference planned for 1996. 
The Treaty of Maastricht gives the Conference the mission of elaborating the 
adjustments to be made relating to enlargement. This might seem a very low 
level of institutional reform, but it at least provides the forum to bring about far- 
reaching reforms. Consider, for example, the issue of membership to the Com­
mission. Since we cannot predict any further addition of representatives of 
single countries (with further splits of the Community portfolios), we might be 
forced to renovate the Commission, deriving it partly from the political groups 
of the European Parliament and giving room to representatives of national States 
for the remaining part only. This change, due more to necessity than political 
choice, would inevitably imply a higher degree of political integration. At that 
point, why not correct the basic defects of the entire construction, by gearing it, 
more firmly, to the fundamental principles of the Treaty, the first of which is 
subsidiarity? Two are the basic defects: too many areas of responsibility, most 
of which are areas of intergovernmental cooperation and not of common action; 
and secondly, the very cumbersome procedures. We have touched upon the first 
one, let me spend a few but very frank words on the second. These incredible 
procedures are due, in my view, to the political necessity to give more room to 
the European Parliament, leaving however the bulk of the decision-making 
powers in the hands of the Council of Ministers and the Commission. The con­
sequence is that the procedures are lengthy; Parliament is involved, but its real 
weight is, and remains very minimal. The new, and great leap forward to date 
has been the joint decision-making procedure, provided for under the Maastricht 
Treaty. Well, admittedly, it is a procedure with fifteen or sixteen stages, with a 
proposal of the Commission that goes to the Council, then it is passed on to the 




























































































the Council, then to the Commission, then back again, and so on and so forth. At 
the end of it, such a long period of time might have elapsed, that you don't even 
remember why you began this kind of procedure and what kind of problem it 
sought to resolve in the first place.
My proposals for institutional reform refer to both defects at the same time. 
First of all, we should cut back the Treaty and reduce the areas of European ju­
risdiction to the few basic fields in which common action makes sense under the 
principle of subsidiarity and which seems plausible to fellow Europeans. 
Obviously, national states should pass these areas to the paramount responsibil­
ity of the Community, which means that immigration, social protection, de­
fence, security and foreign policy, would almost completely exhaust those re­
sponsibilities. Secondly, in these few areas, we should adopt the system appli­
cable to our national legislatures: innovative, primary legislation should be de­
cided upon, unequivocally and definitively, by Parliament; any minor, secondary 
rule should be left to the Commission, without tortuous procedures.
This makes sense in institutional terms, it makes sense also politically, be­
cause it implies a reasonable trade off. Those who want political integration 
have to accept a limited European jurisdiction. Those who want to limit 
European jurisdiction must accept it through a politically integrated framework.
That was my concluding remark, but let now me add two footnotes. I am 
perfectly aware of the fact that the scheme I am proposing does not cover all the 
aspects of a democratic Europe: on the one hand, there is the question of guaran­
teeing the necessary protection of individual rights, and towards the end of the 
process, a more sophisticated relationship must be envisaged between the 
European Court and national Courts; but this is something that judicial experi­
ence will be shaping, as is already the case. On the other hand, there are the pe­
ripheries of European democracy, by which I mean the regions, municipalities, 
social institutions, all of which are necessary to satisfy the need for diversity and 
the advantages of decentralized responsibilities. These too are essential features, 
but they would be the features of a European mess, without erecting the funda­
mental pillars I have referred to.
My last footnote deals with the question of Europe at two speeds: will all the 
twelve countries, and possibly new additions for that matter, share the new con­
struction in its entirety? The question of a single currency might be a problem, 
but not only this: common actions might be taken that are not easily applicable 
to all; there might also be, as a consequence of both problems, the question of 
choosing the countries to be directly represented in the Commission.
As I said earlier, the remaining economic divergencies do not carry any real 
advantages for the weaker and more indebted countries, if we introduce a com­
mon and effective monetary policy. On the contrary, it might lead to political 




























































































the main reason why further steps to unite Europe could partially divide the 
member States into two groups. I do not consider this as an obstacle. As 
President Ciampi has said repeatedly, let us prepare the building and allocate a 
flat to each of us. Those who are ready to enter the building first will do so first. 
The others know that their flats are there waiting to be occupied. It will be up to 
them, to their capacity not to remain outside, to share the benefits of integration 
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